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The Credit Cost Reduction Act of 1997 and
The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act: Problems of Interpretation
By Laurie A. Lucas

L

Introduction

In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act' ("FDCPA" or "Act")
to curb "serious and widespread" abuses by
debt collectors.2 A court recently recited
Congress' rationale for the Act:
Congress explained that although
unscrupulous collectors comprise only a
small portion of the industry, the less
ethical debt collectors threaten consumers
with violence, use profane or obscene
language, make telephone calls at
unreasonable hours, impersonate public
officials and lawyers, disclose debtors'
personal affairs to employers and engage
in other sorts of unscrupulous practices
...The Act's purpose is to eliminate such
practices.
As the Supreme Court of the United States
has recognized, the Act prohibits debt
collectors "from making false or misleading
representations and from engaging in [these
types of]... abusive and unfair practices.
The Act represents a great leap forward in
curbing abusive debt collection tactics.
Congress amended the Act twice, in 19861 and
1996,6 to refine various provisions. However,
this tinkering did not stem the flow of FDCPArelated litigation. Although the Supreme Court
has ruled on only one case involving the
FDCPA,7 litigation concerning the Act
172 ° Loyola ConsumerLaw Review
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continues to increase. In 1987, only fifteen
federal judicial opinions even mentioned the
Act. By contrast, more than 140 federal judicial
opinions addressed some aspect of the Act in
1997. This alarming rise in litigation illustrates
that consumers, debt collectors, litigators, and
judges have experienced difficulty interpreting
and applying various provisions of the Act.
Congress introduced the Credit Cost
Reduction Act of 19978 ("CCRA") as an
amendment to the FDCPA. Currently, the
CCRA has been referred to the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services'
subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit. The proposed CCRA
amendment represents an attempt to resolve
some of the problems in interpreting the
FDCPA. Specifically, the CCRA would amend
the Act for the following reasons: (1) to
provide clarification of the types of litigation
activities that are exempt from the Act's
defimition of "communication" and which
would not require inclusion of the Act's various
affirmative disclosures; (2) to settle the dispute
over whether the validation of debt's 30-day
period operates as an absolute grace period
during which time all collection attempts must
cease, or whether it operates merely as a
dispute period during which time the consumer
may dispute or request verification of the debt;
(3) to require that the damage cap on liability
for a class action include not only the current
action but any series of class actions arising
from the same violations by the same debt
collector; (4) to modify and limit the award of
attorney fees under the Act; and (5) to invoke
Federal Rule 68 to disallow the accrual of
attorney's fees after the date a settlement offer
is extended and rejected if the final award is
less than the offer.
This article examines the proposed
amendment and analyzes its potential effect on
1998

several problems encountered in interpreting
the FDCPA. First, the article analyzes how the
CCRA handles the problem of collection
demands which: (1) are made within the 30day "debt validation" period; and (2) contradict
debt verification disclosures. Second, the article
explores the CCRA's attempt to clarify which
communications involving litigation are exempt
from the Act. Next, the article discusses how
the CCRA would modify the Act's damage cap,
and assesses the resulting impact on class
action litigation. Finally, the article examines
how the CCRA would revise the Act's
provisions controlling attorney's fee awards.

II.
Collection Activity Following
Initial Notice
A.

Validation of Debts-

Disclosure Requirements
The FDCPA's "validation of debts"
provisions require a debt collector to send a
consumer a set of disclosures in the initial
communication or within five days of the initial
communication. These disclosures represent a
frequent basis for violations simply because the
FDCPA mandates specific content, but provides
little meaningful guidance, as to the appropriate
form the required disclosures should take. The
Act only requires the following information:
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the
debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer,
within thirty days after receipt of the
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or
any portion thereof, the debt will be
Loyola University ChicagoSchoolofLaw • 173

assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer
notifies the debt collector in writing within
the thirty-day period that the debt, or any
portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the
debt or a copy of ajudgment against the
consumer and a copy of such verification
or judgment will be mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's
written request within the thirty-day
period, the debt collector will provide the
consumer with the name and address of
the original creditor, if different from the
current creditor.9
Debt collectors commonly refer to these
disclosures as "civil Mirandawarnings." 10
Courts evaluate the efficacy of particular
notices only after the fact and on a case-by-case
basis using the "least-sophisticated consumer"'
standard. Under this standard, a collection
notice which can plausibly be read to have two
or more different meanings, at least one of
which is misleading, violates the Act. 2 The
"least sophisticated consumer" standard
focuses on whether the validation notice was
overshadowed or contradicted by other
language in the communication, and the
standard has figured prominently in many court
decisions. 3 A frequent interpretation problem
crops up in litigation concerning the Act: does
the Act give the consumer a 30-day "grace
period" during which collection attempts must
cease, or does it simply give the consumer 30
days to dispute or request verification of a
debt? Debt collectors risk violating the Act
when they demand or take any action within
the 30-day validation period ifthe demand or
174 ° Loyola Consumer Law Review

action contradicts the validation notice. This
interpretation implies that, within the 30-day
period, debt collectors who make any
communications demanding payment will
violate the Act. The case of Russell v. Equifax
A.R.S. 14 illustrates how one court resolved this
issue.

B.

Demands Which Contradict the

Validation Disclosures Within the 30day Period - Russell v. Equifax

A.R.S.
In Russell, the debt collector sent two
notices to the debtor. The first notice was a
two-sided letter. The front side was captioned
"IMMEDIATE COLLECTION NOTICE," and
closed with the warning "IT IS OUR
PRACTICE TO POST UNPAID
COLLECTIONS... TO INDIVIDUAL
CREDIT RECORDS. 15The reverse side
contained the validation notice. The second
notice was captioned "CONTACT THIS
OFFICE AT ONCE" and closed with,
"PAYMENT IN FULL WITHIN 5 DAYS IS
NOW DEMANDED." 6 Given these
contradictory statements and implicit threats,
the court found that the 1692g notice was
ineffective because the language urging
immediate action contradicted and
overshadowed the 30-day debt verification
provisions. 7 Furthermore, the court noted that
"[b]y demanding payment within five days [in
the second notice], the debt collector gave the
debtor only 25 days from the date of the first
notice to decide whether to challenge the
claim. This period of time is less than the 30
days required to be given a consumer under the
Act." 11 The court's holding implies that the
30-day period is an absolute grace period for
the consumer and that any notice sent after the
Volume 10, number 2
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validation notice contradicting the 30-day
period violates the Act.

C.
Proposed CCRA Amendments
Addressing the 30-Day Period Issue
Courts encountering this issue have
exhibited little consistency in resolving it. 19
The CCRA amendment would address this
problem by adding the following subsection to
the Act's validation of debts section:
(d) CONTINUATION DURING
PERIOD-Collectionactivities and
communications may continue
during the 30-day period described
in subsection (a) unless the
consumer requests the cessationof
20
such activities.
This section would resolve the 30-day issue
by allowing collection attempts to proceed
during the 30-day validation period unless the
consumer requests that the activities cease. The
CCRA amendment does not specify whether
the consumer's request must be in writing and
therefore will undoubtedly invite more
litigation on this point. In addition, while the
CCRA amendment would resolve the dispute
over the 30-day issue, it does little to address
the substance of many consumers' complaints
(e.g., that dunning letters and other
communications usually attempt to pressure
the consumer into paying the debt within the
30-day period).
The CCRA amendment, theoretically, would
have relieved the debt collector in Russell from
liability resulting from the conflicting demands
about time (though not the threat to "post
unpaid collections"). The CCRA amendment,
however, does nothing to address the type of

1998

coercive language used in most dunning
letters. Since the CCRA amendment would
require nothing in regard to the appropriate
form for a validation notice, but would only
relieve the debt collector from liability from
conflicting statements about time, abuses of
this type would likely continue and would
probably increase.

D.

Recommendation: Combine the

CCRA Proposed Amendment With a
"Clear and Conspicuous" Standard
Governing the Validation Notice
Many debt collection communications
"bury" the validation notice in obscure or
unreadable portions of the communication.
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the
regulatory agency primarily responsible for
enforcing the Act,2 has taken an active role in
fighting this practice by repeatedly urging
Congress to enact an appropriate standard
governing the appearance of the validation
notice.22 The agency recently described how
"[s]ome debt collectors print the notice...
in a type size considerably smaller than the
language in the dunning letter, or obscure the
notice by printing it on a non-contrasting
background in a non-contrasting color. 2In
order to eliminate this abusive tactic, the FTC
advised Congress to explicitly require a "clear
and conspicuous" format for the notice.24
If enacted, the CCRA amendment should be
coupled with a provision that addresses this
unfair and misleading practice. Since an
overwhelming number of cases alleging
violations under the Act will include a 1692g
allegation, perhaps the best course would be to
simply mandate a uniform "federal box" 21 for
the validation of debts information in line with
the "clear and conspicuous" standard. Such a
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mandate would arguably do more to decrease
the cost of credit than an amendment allowing
debt collectors free reign to continue collecting
debts during the 30-day period while providing
little guidance regarding the required efficacy
of the notice.
Il.
Exemption for Communications
Involving Legal Proceedings

Act does apply to legal activity. In Heintz, the
Supreme Court interpreted section 1692e( 11)
of the Act, which at that time stated that "the
failure to disclose clearly in all communications
made to collect a debt or to obtain information
about a consumer, that the debt collector is
attempting to collect a debt and that any
information obtained will be used for that
purpose[,]" 2 9 constitutes a violation of that

section. Heintz affirmed the circuit courts,
which had held that this language applies to
litigation activity as long as the other elements
of the "debt collector" definition were met.30 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the
holdings of other cases, which had held that a
literal or technical reading of the Act to include
legal activities did not comport with
Congressional intent." Heintz also rejected the
FTC's position on the issue.32 The FTC
"Commentary" concluded that the Act covered
attorneys engaged in debt collection activities.
Arguably, Heintz would expand the Act's reach
to attorneys who simply filed a complaint,
noticed parties for a deposition, or followed
federal or state procedural requirements. This
momentous holding in Heintz set the stage for
the 1996 amendment to § 1692e(11); the
amendment specifically exempted the Miranda
warning requirement from litigation activities.

Under the FDCPA, another point of
contention involves communications the debt
collector must include in the various affirmative
disclosures. Until the 1996 amendment to the
FDCPA, it was unclear when, in what type, and
how often the warning was required in
communications with the consumer.26 Under
the Act, the FTC is required to make yearly
reports and recommendations to Congress.
FDCPA, § 16921. 37 For example, it is unclear
whether the Act requires debt collectors to
include the Mirandawarning in various
communications with consumers. Similar
confusion surrounds the extent to which
attorneys must include Mirandawarnings in
formal pleadings filed to collect debts.
Resolution of this issue has become crucial to
attorneys in the debt collection field since filing
lawsuits to collect debts is, at least
theoretically, a "communication" with the
B.
The 1996 Amendment Overrode
consumer requiring inclusion of the Miranda
27
warning in any pleadings or motions.
Heintz

A.

Heintz v. Jenkins Resolved (For

a Short Time) the Circuit Court Split
The question of whether and what type of
legal activities were covered under the Act
created a split in the circuit courts. The United
States Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue in Heintz v. Jenkins28 by holding that the
176 ° Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

Congress amended the FDCPA in 1996.
Partially in response to the Heintz decision, the
amended section 1692e( 11) now reads as
follows:
The failure to disclose in the initial written
communication with the consumer and, in
addition, if the initial communication with
Volume 10, number 2
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the consumer is oral, in that initial oral
communication, that the debt collector is
attempting to collect a debt and that any
information obtained will be used for that
purpose, and the failure to disclose in
subsequent communications that the
communication is from a debt collector,
[constitutes an FDCPA violation] except
that this paragraph shall not apply to a
formal pleading made in connection with a
legal action.33
The amended section now requires full
disclosure only in the initial (oral or written)
communication, and a modified disclosure
stating that the communication is from a debt
collector in subsequent communications.
Furthermore, the amendment clearly exempted
"formal pleadings" from the Miranda
requirement. The new section 1692e( 11)
induced a sigh of relief from attorneys involved
in debt collection litigation because such
attorneys who satisfy the Act's definition of
"debt collector"34 are no longer subject to
liability for failure to include the Miranda
notice in formal pleadings.

C.

Interpretive Problems Remain

Even after the 1996 amendment, however,
interpretive problems remained with the
FDCPA, which the proposed CCRA
amendment would remedy. First, the 1996
amendment exempted only the Miranda
requirement from "formal pleadings." The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define
"pleadings" as the complaint, answer, replies to
counterclaims, answers to cross-claims, third
party complaints, and third party answers.35
How the courts will interpret the words "formal
pleadings" and whether they will do so
uniformly remains to be seen.36 In addition,
1998

attorneys who fall within the Act's definition of
"debt collectors" must still grapple with the fact
that the 1996 amendment did not address other
obligations imposed by the Act. For instance, it
is still unclear whether the 1996 amendment
would relieve attorneys from having to include
the affirmative disclosures mandated under
section 1692g - the Act's validation of debts
section - in formal pleadings or in any
communication related to litigation activities.
D.

Proposed CCRA Amendments

The proposed CCRA would amend section
1692a(2) to read as follows:
(2) The Term "communication" means
the conveying of information regarding a
debt directly or indirectly to any person
through any medium. Such term does not
include actions taken pursuantto the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure;in the
case of a proceeding in a State court, the
rules of civil procedure availableunder
the laws of such State; or a nonjudicial
foreclosure.37
The CCRA amendment, therefore, would
clarify and expand upon the 1996 amendment's
definition of the term "formal pleadings." This
clarification would serve to reduce future
litigation by eliminating the need to establish
the meaning of the term "formal pleadings."
The broader CCRA amendment also would
clarify whether other affirmative obligations, in
addition to the validation of debt disclosures,
are exempt from the Act's definition of
litigation activities. This latter clarification
would prove especially helpful because the
validation of debt section generates substantial
numbers of FDCPA violations.
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IV

Class Action Lawsuits Under

The FDCPA
A.
The FDCPA's Damage Cap and
Class Action Lawsuits - Mace v. Van
Ru Credit Corporation
Class action lawsuits in consumer litigation
are on the rise. This increase is reflected in the
FDCPA case law and has created more
interpretation problems for the courts. For
instance, questions have arisen about whether
the FDCPA's class action damage cap implicitly
requires a nationwide class action suit, as
opposed to allowing a series of class action
38
suits. In Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corporation,
the Seventh Circuit reviewed the lower court's
denial of Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiffs' proposed
class certification; the denial was based on the
argument that allowing a series of class actions
against the same debt collector for the same
violations would negate the purpose of the cap
by repeatedly exposing the same debt collector
to liability in different jurisdictions. InMace,
Plaintiff alleged various violations under the
Act based on letters that Defendant sent to her
and other Wisconsin residents. Plaintiff
requested class certification limited to
Wisconsin. 39 The lower court reasoned that
the damage cap implicitly precluded limitation
of the action to one state.4° In light of this
preclusion, the court denied certification
because the court calculated that a large,
nationwide class would receive only a de
minimis recovery resulting in an inferior form
of adjudication if the class were certified.
On appeal, Defendant compared the Truth in
Lending Act's ("TILA") damage provisions to
those of the FDCPA.4 ' Since the language in
the TILA requires a nationwide class,
Defendant argued that the FDCPA dictated the
178 9 Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

same result. The Seventh Circuit noted one
critical difference between the FDCPA and the
TILA damage provisions: the TILA language
encompassing "any class action or series of
class actions.42 This language would require a
nationwide class, but since the FDCPA does
not include it, the court relied instead on the
FDCPA's plain language to support its position
that the FDCPA did not require a nationwide
class. Given the FDCPA's lack of the "any class
action or series of class actions" limitation, the
court's conclusion in Mace is unobjectionable.
However, the proposed CCRA amendment, if
enacted, would dictate an entirely different
result.

B.
Proposed CCRA Amendment
Would Implicitly Require Nationwide
Classes
The CCRA amendment would modify
section 1692k(2)(B) as follows to include the
"series of class actions" language requiring a
nationwide class:
(B) In the case of a class action, or any
series of class actions arisingout of the
same violations by the same debt
collector,(I) such amount for each named
plaintiff as could be recovered under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as
the court may allow for all other class
members of such class action or series of
class actions, without regard to a
minimum individual recovery, not to
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per
centum of the net worth of the debt
43
collector;
Whether the CCRA amendment would
achieve its goal of decreasing the cost of credit
Volume 10, number 2
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by requiring nationwide class actions under the
FDCPA is far from clear. The issue clearly
deserves further study. The Mace decision
highlights some of the problems with such an
amendment, including a lack of authority
requiring that a class action embrace the
broadest possible class, the different purposes
underlying the TILA and the FDCPA, and the
fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
encourage specific and limited classes. More
importantly, the Mace court argued that the
possibility of a de minimis recovery should not
automatically bar a class action since:
[t]he policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregatingthe relativelypaltry
potentialrecoveries into something worth
someone ' (usually an attorney') labor.44
Thus, the proposed CCRA amendment
represents a misguided attempt to impose a
nationwide class requirement. This result
would undermine Congress' purpose in
enacting the FDCPA, and would contradict the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
encourage specific and limited classes.
Accordingly, the proposed CCRA amendment
probably constitutes a step in the wrong
direction on the class action issue.
V.
Attorney's Fees Allowable Under
The FD CPA
The cost of litigating very small claims raises
a serious problem under the FDCPA. Given the
minimal amounts usually involved in consumer
I"9

debts, providing incentives for attorneys to take
an FDCPA case is important and represents a
driving force behind the Act's allowance for
statutory damages up to $1,000, 4" costs, and
46
attorney's fees related to successful suits.

A.

Lee v. Gibson Highlights the

"Attorney's Fee" Problem
A recent Sixth Circuit case, Lee v. Thompson
& Thompson,47 provides an example of the
FDCPA's attorney's fee problem. In Lee,
Plaintiff alleged a technical violation of the Act
and sought only statutory damages. Plaintiff's
attorney submitted a request for a $12,759
attorney's fee award. When the court rendered
judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of
$1,106.85, includingattorney's fees, Plaintiff
appealed. The court noted that Plaintiff was
only "the nominal appellant, [and the attorney
was] obviously the real party in interest.4" In
fact, the attorney admitted that it was the
attorney's fee award that provided the
motivation for the appeal.4 9 The court affirmed
the lower award. The Lee case illustrates a
serious problem under the Act: that it costs a
great deal to litigate what are, in some cases,
very small claims. Limiting the attorney's fee
award to the equivalent of statutory and actual
damages, however, is not the best way to deal
with this problem and arguably contradicts the
purpose of the Act.
B.

Proposed CCRA Amendment

The CCRA amendment also would change
the damages structure of the FDCPA by
modifying the provisions controlling the award
of attorney's fees. Currently, section
1692k(a)(3) reads as follows:
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(3) in the case of any successful action to
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of
the action, together with a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the court.
On a finding by the court that an action
under this section was brought in bad faith
and for the purpose of harassment, the
court may award to the defendant
attorney's fees reasonable in relation to
the work expended and costs. 0
The CCRA amendment would modify the
section as follows:
(3) subject to subsection 09,51 in the case
of a successful action to enforce a
liability underparagraph(1) or (2), the
costs of the action, including reasonable
attorney fees, as determined by the
court, in an amount not to exceed the
amount awardedin such action under the
52
applicableparagraph.
The CCRA amendment, therefore, would
limit the award of attorney's fees to the
equivalent of the amount of statutory and
actual damages awarded. Since statutory
damages are limited to $1,000 per action5 3 and
the amount of actual damages is likely to be
small, this portion of the CCRA amendment
would eviscerate the Act's provisions designed
to make FDCPA actions "worth someone's
labor."
The final change to the damage provisions
under the CCRA amendment would be to add a
new subsection (f) to section 1692k. This
subsection would impose Rule 68 on the Act's
provisions, and would read as follows:
(f) RULES APPLICABLE TO
ACTIONS UNDER THIS TITLENotwithstanding any other provision
180
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of law, in any action arising under
this title, for purposes of Rule 68 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the following provisions shall apply:
(1) PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S
FEES - Costs shall include
reasonable fees for the plaintiff's
attorney.
(2) DISALLOWANCE OF
CERTAIN FEES ACCRUING
AFTER REFUSAL OF
SETTLEMENT OFFER- In
accordance with Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure,
if(A) an offer is made by the debt
collector to a consumer bringing an
action (including any class action or
series of class actions referred to in
subsection (a)(2)(3)) under this title,
and the offer is not accepted; and
(B) the amount of the final judgment
awarded to the consumer (or, in the
case of a class action or series of
class actions, the total amount
awarded to all class members in such
class action or series of class actions)
is less than or equal to the amount of
the offer referred to in subparagraph
(A),
[then] the consumer (or the class
with regard to a class action or series
of class actions) may not be awarded
or otherwise recover costs for
attorney's fees incurred after the date
such offer is rejected.-
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This proposal may operate to limit the
number of frivolous "annoyance" suits brought
by consumer debtors. However, the amendment
would most likely induce debtors' attorneys
into prematurely accepting "low-ball"
settlement offers. Overall, the amendment does
little to achieve an equal playing field between
attorneys on opposing sides of the FDCPA
litigation field. The CCRA's proposed
amendments to section 1692k(b), discussed
below, may provide a better solution.

awarded the plaintiff only $500 in actual and
statutory damages. On appeal, the court
reduced this award by 45% "to account for the
time spent litigating unsuccessful claims and
[the] plaintiff's limited success." 17 The court
reached this decision based on a strained
reading of section 1692k(b)'s language. The
court reasoned that this provision justified a
reduction in the attorney's fee award when the
plaintiff litigated unsuccessful FDCPA claims
along with claims ultimately proving
successful.5

VI. Factors Considered in
Determining Liability Under the

B.

FDCPA
In determining damages awarded under the
FDCPA, the Act requires judges to consider
specific factors. Section 1692k(b) currently
identifies the following factors: "[A]mong
other relevant factors - (1) in any individual
action under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this
section, the frequency and persistence of
noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature
of such noncompliance, and the extent to which
such noncompliance was intentional;" 55
Unfortunately, some courts have stretched the
meaning of this section to reduce damages
awarded to plaintiffs in successful FDCPA
actions. The recent decision in Vandzura v. C &
S Adjusters, Inc.56 provides an excellent
illustration of this problem.
A.

Reducing DamageAwards for

Actions that Include Unsuccessful
Claims - Vandzura v. C & S

Adjusters, Inc.
In Vandzura, the attorney's fee and cost
award exceeded $18,000, while the court
1998

Proposed CCRA Amendment

The CCRA amendment would modify part of
section 1692k(b) by substituting a new
subsection to read as follows:
(b) Factors Considered by the Court
In determining the amount of any award
under subsection (a) of this section, the
court shall consider, among other relevant
factors
(1) In any action under subsection
(a)(2)(A), the frequency andpersistence
of noncompliance by the debt collector,
the nature of such noncompliance, the
extent to which the such noncompliance
was intentional,and the amount of actual
damages awarded;59
The initial change of "liability in any action"
to "any award" appears to be cosmetic.
Adding "the amount of actual damages
awarded" to the factors would appear to allow
a court to remit an excessive award to bring the
award in line with the amount of damages the
consumer actually suffered. The CCRA
amendment would provide a more reliable
vehicle for the court to use in order remit
Loyola University ChicagoSchool ofLaw 181

fees awards when the action is successful. This
fact raises a serious issue for consumers and for
those involved in the collection industry,
especially ethical debt collectors trying to
comply with this complex piece of legislation.
The CCRA amendment's modification of the
factors considered by courts when awarding
attorneys fees is a better way to deal with the
attorney's fee problem. By considering the
amount of actual damages suffered, the
amendment provides courts with some leeway
V.
Conclusion
to remit attorney's fee awards without
automatically limiting those awards. Finally, the
The Cost Credit Reduction Act of 1997
addition of a Rule 68 requirement is probably a
provides several answers to many of the
good idea, since it would encourage settlement
problems of interpretation under the FDCPA.
of FDCPA claims. The CCRA amendment
The CCRA amendment's clarification of what
type of communications require inclusion of the would clarify much of the FDCPA, thus
increasing its efficacy in protecting consumers
Act's affirmative disclosures, especially those
against debt collection abuses. Overall,
communications related to litigation activities,
however, the proposed CCRA amendment
would help reduce the need for litigation on
would probably do more to undermine the
those issues. To have a real effect on the cost
of credit (by reducing the amount of litigation), purposes of the FDCPA than it would to
effectuate those goals.
the CCRA amendment also should include
some guidance, such as a "federal box"
requirement in relation to the Act's validation
notice as this section of the Act is a constant
source of litigation.
However, not all of the CCRA amendment's
modifications seem compatible with the
Endnotes
purposes of the FDCPA. The CCRA
.
FAm DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15
requirement that class action lawsuits require a
U.S.C.
§§
1692-1692o (1996) [hereinafter "FDCPA"].
nationwide class deserves further study.
Moreover, by severely limiting the award of
2.
See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33
attorney's fees recoverable under the Act, the
(2d Cir. 1996).
CCRA arguably would eliminate an important
3.
incentive for consumers to pursue private
See id.
enforcement of their FDCPA rights. Litigation
4.
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).
in cases where the alleged violations are merely
"technical" and the consumer has suffered no
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